On May 15, 2026, UBC submitted its closing submissions. Here is a link to the Complainants’ Closing Submissions, filed January 30, 2026 and further amended March 13, 2026. In the file below, I have redacted the names of one witness who wished to be anonymized, and of Student D, a Mordvinov Class Member who opted out, which UBC mistakenly did not redact in several places.
The University harshly criticizes some witnesses, including Stephen Hay and Tara McBryan, the General Class Member from Zoology who endured harassment so severe she lost a year of work on her M.S. and had to start over on a new project. UBC adduced no witnesses or documents to rebut Ms. McBryan’s testimony, and instead relies on a rosy view of the testimony presented by Monica Kay. Ms. Kay explicitly admitted that she could have done better for Ms. McBryan.
I will note that UBC did not argue that their witness, Professor Leslie Paris, did not retaliate against her students and Mordvinov Class Members Sarah Thornton and Kaitlin Russell, both of whom experienced alienation in the History Department after the events and who did not complete their M.A. theses for years after. This is the fate that Caitlin Cunningham and I successfully avoided by being graduates who complained, rather than current students. Professor Paris confronted Sarah Thornton on the street in the midst of this Hearing, as previously posted.
On August 26, 2026, the Complainants submitted our Reply submissions to UBC’s closing argument.
Below I excerpt a few key arguments in the Reply, showing that UBC asserts positions which are legally and factually incorrect. UBC’s positions highlight the defiance of the University. It argues, essentially, that NONE of its actions violated the human rights of the female students, notwithstanding the harm to the women, the adverse finding in Hale v. UBCO that the NAM process violated the rights of female students, and notwithstanding that the University scrambled to change everything after media pressure. It does not even argue that the policy and practical environment has changed; instead, it argues nothing was ever wrong with any choices its untrained, legally ignorant personnel made.
- In its submissions [1198], the University continues to suggest that just presenting the full case to the respondent in the NAM process is sufficient. Given the findings in Hale No. 5, as well as our very pointed submissions here about the harm to complainants of not being provided with any clue about the respondent’s response, this is surprising and discouraging. It is not “inconsistent” for us to be very critical of a process that leaves complainants entirely in the dark about the responses to their complaint from respondents and witnesses, but also having to respond to that response on the spot in a hearing. We do not agree that our position shifts. We are very clear about what would be a better approach.
- The University says that it is “incorrect to state that the University has any obligation to apply a human rights analysis to the allegations” (Submissions [1189]). We fundamentally disagree and suggest this is a very surprising submission. When allegations come forward that clearly amount to allegations of sexual harassment amounting to discrimination, the University is required by law to ensure that it fully complies with its obligations to remedy discrimination which has occurred and to restore non-discriminatory conditions. This requires it to apply a human rights analysis. The University cannot expect to comply with its Human Rights Code obligations not to discriminate and to ameliorate discriminatory conditions if it does not do so. The University’s view that somehow considering its human rights obligations under the Code is optional is a fundamental error, an error that was all too evident in the evidence in this case.
- The University suggests that if it took action (in particular to implement the requirements of the Human Rights Code), those actions “would likely be ultra vires” (Submissions [1202]). This is a fundamentally incorrect position; the University is required to implement the Human Rights Code, and must be considered to have the powers necessary to do so. The University’s power to discipline is far from the only power it is able and required to bring to bear if discrimination is occurring. This is especially so since the provisions of the Code prevail if there is conflict between the Code and any other enactment (Code, s. 4), which we say clearly includes the University Act. The University’s apparent belief that it is not empowered to act by the requirements of the Code amounts to an impoverished view of its own powers and jurisdiction which we say improperly limited the actions it was prepared to take in the cases considered here. Multiple witnesses were asked if they considered whether the Human Rights Code required them to act in various situations. The answer was generally that they had not considered this question at all.
- The University says that UBC’s jurisdiction over student conduct is limited by its own policies, including the Student Code of Conduct (Submissions [1205]). This is incorrect. First and foremost, the University cannot contract out of its obligation to provide a working, studying and living environment free of discrimination by enacting any given policy as part of its contract with its students, including the Calendar (which includes the Student Code of Conduct). If it had enacted policies which prevented it from acting effectively to prevent and remediate discrimination, its policies would breach the Code, and could not therefore amount to a valid defense.
- The University suggests in particular that the Student Code of Conduct prevented the University from addressing conduct that did not occur on or near campus, or at University-sponsored activities with direct campus connections because such conduct fell outside the scope of the University’s “disciplinary
jurisdiction” (Submissions [1205]). We say this argument rests on the fallacy that that the only mode in which the University can act is its disciplinary mode. We say this assertion is fundamentally incorrect. The University can and must also act to prevent and ameliorate discrimination, including by preventing circumstances where women are not safe and secure.
- The University suggests that eviction from residence, campus bans, and campus restrictions were disciplinary actions by the University (Submission [1207]). This is incorrect. None relied on the President’s power under the University Act to discipline. RW was evicted because he breached the Resident’s contract. Persons who were not students were banned from campus under the common law rules of property and trespass. Mordvinov was banned from campus as a security risk. These events in fact underscore our point that the University has the capacity to act to preserve safety and security of women, and to ensure or restore a discrimination-free environment for women in relation to sex-related risks. Ultimately, we say the University is required to act in order to comply with the Code, the Code authorizes the University to act, and doing so is always therefore within the University’s “legal and policy boundaries”.
- The University says that proceeding under Policy 3 would have been ineffective in the case of Mordvinov (Submissions [1235]). Its basis for this claim is that because two Administrative Heads of Unit were involved, a single act by either would not have solved the issues for all complainants. The University does not address why both could not have acted, which could have solved the issues for all complainants, except to say that Dr. Loo could not have restricted Mordvinov’s access to the History Department. We say this is incorrect. Following receipt of information about Mordvinov’s sexual assault of Student B, Dr. Loo could have determined that Mordvinov could no longer be a student in the History Department (after giving him a due opportunity to respond). This would have removed any legitimate basis for him being present in the History Department, or anywhere else on campus, and would have permitted the University to act under Policy 14, as it eventually did in any event. We note that when the University acted under Policy 14, it did not obtain any response from Mordvinov to the allegations against him before doing so, contrary to the arguments it is now making about its obligations of due process.
I have been holding off from posting these arguments until it was confirmed that UBC will not be seeking sur-reply. The deadline has passed for UBC to indicate its interest in doing so.
Clea has been drafting an application regarding anonymizing a Class Member. Despite UBC’s frequent complaining that it respects the autonomy and privacy of students, it opposed anonymizing this witness without citing any authority. I have redacted the witness’s name in the submissions.
Clea is also drafting an application for costs due to the way UBC conducted discovery, which led to delays during the hearing and impaired the entry of evidence. The Tribunal gave leave in Kirchmeier No. 3, 2020 BCHRT 102, para. 40, for this application.
